Chapter 12 |
- OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
- Description of an NPP
- General description of a pressurised water reactor
- Core, fuel and fuel management
- Primary system and secondary systems
- Cooling systems
- Reactor containment building
- The main auxiliary and safeguard systems
- Other safety-related systems
- Operation of a nuclear power plant
- EDF organisational structures
- ASN review of operating documents
- ASN oversight of reactor outages
- THE MAJOR NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION ISSUES
- Human and organisational factors
- Workers
- Nuclear safety as related to organisational and human factors
- Management of subcontracted activities
- Continuous nuclear safety improvements
- Oversight of anomaly correction
- Examination of events and operating experience feedback
- Periodic safety reviews
- Approving modifications to equipment and operating rules
- Integration of nuclear power plant (NPP) ageing
- The age of the French NPPs in operation
- Main factors in ageing
- How EDF manages equipment ageing
- Examination of extended operation
- EPR reactors
- The steps up to commissioning of the Flamanville 3 reactor
- Construction oversight in 2011
- Cooperation with foreign nuclear regulators
- The reactors of the future: initiating discussions on generation IV safety
- Reliance on nuclear safety and radiation protection research
- NUCLEAR SAFETY
- Operation and control
- Operation under normal conditions: ensuring compliance with baseline safety standards
and authorising changes to documents
- Examination of incident or accident operating rules
- Maintenance and testing
- Regulating maintenance practices
- Examining the qualification of scientific applications
- Guaranteeing the use of efficient control methods
- Authorising periodic test programmes
- Fuel
- Controlling in-pile fuel management changes
- Monitoring fuel status in the reactor
- In-depth oversight of primary and secondary systems
- Monitoring and checking the systems
- Monitoring of nickel-based alloy zones
- Checking reactor vessel strength
- Monitoring steam generator maintenance and replacement
- Checking containment conformity
- Application of pressure equipment rules and regulations
- Ensuring hazard protection
- Prevention of seismic risks
- Drafting flood prevention rules
- Preventing heatwave and drought risks
- Taking account of the fire risk
- Checking that the explosion risk has been considered
- RADIATION PROTECTION, PROTECTION OF WORKERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
- Oversight of occupational radiation protection
- Oversight of radiation protection in operating NPPs
- Radiation protection requirements for NPPs in the construction phase
- Oversight of application of labour legislation in NPPs
- Controlling the environmental and health impacts of NPPs
- Reviewing discharge requirements
- Oversight of waste management
- Increasing protection against other risks and forms of pollution
- CURRENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION
- The NPPs inspection campaign and complementary safety assessments
following the Fukushima accident
- Monitoring the construction of the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor
- Examination of the Penly 3 creation authorisation decree
- Examination of the safety options for the ATMEA 1 reactor project
- Modification of the Blayais 3-4 creation authorisation decree
- Continued operation of the nuclear power plants
- Notable findings relating to oversight of pressure equipment
- Notable findings relating to occupational health and safety inspections
- Notable findings relating to radiation protection of personnel
- Notable findings relating to the environmental impacts of NPPs and discharges
- ASSESSMENTS
Reactors in operation
- Evaluating the head offices and overall performance of NPPs
- Evaluating nuclear safety
- Evaluating human and organisational measures
- Evaluating and analysing radiation protection
- Evaluating health and safety, professional relations and the quality of employment in
the nuclear power plants
- Evaluating and analysing environmental protection measures
- Analysing statistics on significant events
- Evaluation of each site
New reactors
- Evaluating EPR Flamanville 3 reactor construction
- OUTLOOK
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With regard to NPPs, ASN's regulatory and inspection duties in
2012 will be primarily concerned with the subjects presented
below:
Regulation of the EPR and actions relating to new
reactors
Regulation of the EPR reactor
Surveillance of construction of the Flamanville 3 EPR will
continue until authorisation for commissioning of the
installation. EDF at present anticipates initial operation at rated
power in 2016. Between now and then, ASN will be continuing
its monitoring of occupational accident risk prevention, EDF's
surveillance of the quality of construction, both for the work
done on the site and for the manufacturing work done by EDF
suppliers and the manufacturing of nuclear pressure
equipment. At the same time, ASN will be continuing its
advance review of certain elements of the commissioning
application file, together with the Advisory committee for
reactors and, for the reactors in operation, will examine the
hard core requested by ASN further to the complementary
safety assessments. ASN will develop the regulation tools
necessary for managing the preparation and inspection of the
facility start-up tests and the final review of the commissioning
authorisation application file. ASN will carry out these steps
jointly with its counterparts also involved in the project.
Other actions relating to new reactors
Subsequent to the statement by WENRA published in
November 2010 on the safety objectives for new reactors, ASN
will contribute to actions aiming to promote these objectives in
the worldwide thinking on these subjects initiated by the IAEA
or within the MDEP framework. Moreover, ASN will continue
to work within WENRA on the development of common
positions on subjects resulting from these safety objectives and
that warrant clarification.
Labour inspection
ASN will ensure that labour inspection officers are regularly
present in the field, in particular for construction and
maintenance site activities.
Following the deviations observed on the sites since 2009 with
regard to the maximum working hours overruns and the
insufficient rest periods, but also EDF's 2011 implementation of
a policy of early planning of working hours during reactor
outages, ASN will be particularly attentive to tangible measures
affecting working hours, in particular for the management. It
will continue its inspections in this area to evaluate the
undertakings, assess their actual implementation and penalise
any deviations observed.
ASN will focus on implementing the measures defined in the
2012 action plan from the Ministry for Labour concerning
labour inspection duties, as well as in the national occupational
health and safety plan, by emphasising health and safety, quality
of employment, social dialogue and combating illegal labour. In
the second half of the year, it will be taking part in the
European campaign to prevent stress-related risks.
Finally, with a view to developing an integrated view of safety,
the ASN labour inspectors will be associated and coordinated
with other ASN regulation and monitoring actions, for example
in the field of subcontracted maintenance.
Radiation protection and protection of the
environment
Radiation protection
ASN expects of EDF that it strengthen its radiation protection
policy with, notably, better preparation of interventions and
progress in controlling contamination at source.
The Authority will be attentive to compliance on these different
aspects in the files it will be examining, and during on-site
inspections. Following on from the wide-ranging inspection
carried out in 2011 on the four Loire Valley sites (Belleville-sur-
Loire, Dampierre, Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux and Chinon), ASN
will carry out further in-depth inspections in order to continue
with its detailed assessment of the radiation protection
measures taken by EDF.
Environmental Protection
In 2012, once it has received the files from EDF, ASN will begin
its review of the effluent discharge and water intake license
renewal files for the Bugey and then Fessenheim sites, the
provisions of these licenses being currently specified in
relatively old orders. ASN will ensure that the discharge limits
are set for these two sites according to the best available
techniques and taking account of experience feedback from the
NPPs in operation.
ASN will continue to review the effluent discharge and water
intake modification files for Cruas-Meysse and Belleville and
will begin those of Saint-Alban, Cattenom and Paluel.
It will continue to work with the licensee to optimise
discharges, in accordance with the measures decided on
following the meeting of the Advisory Committee for reactors in
2006 concerning the management of radioactive effluents and
chemical effluents associated with the French NPPs in
operation. ASN will continue to review the files concerning
steam generator cleaning, management of cleaning effluents and
the fate of the used generators.
It will also devote efforts in the field to checking that the
measures envisaged by EDF to tackle legionnaire's disease, but
also to reduce coolant fluid emissions and to replace chiller
units, are actually implemented on the sites.
Finally, ASN will continue to ensure that account is taken of the
experience feedback from the SOCATRI and FBFC events, by
analysing the further steps taken by EDF and by means of
targeted inspections.
Hazard prevention
Preventing fires and explosions
ASN will check compliance with the requirements concerning
management of the fire and explosion risks in the files it will be
reviewing and in its site inspections.
With regard to checking integration of the fire risk, ASN will be
particularly attentive to the steps taken by EDF with regard to
management of fire sectoring and management of fire loads.
With regard to the explosion risk, ASN will for example be
carrying out inspections to continue to monitor the steps taken
by EDF following the ASN decision concerning management of
the risk of NPP on-site explosions (decision 2008-DC-0118 of
13 November 2008), as well as compliance with the
requirements of the regulations concerning occupational safety in
an explosive atmosphere (ATEX).
Flood prevention
In 2012, ASN will submit the draft guidelines on protection of
BNIs against external flooding to the advisory committees for
reactors, laboratories and plants. These draft guidelines were
produced by a working group which, between 2006 and 2009,
brought together ASN, IRSN, the nuclear industry licensees and
experts from the field of hydrology. Public consultation on this
project was organised in 2010.
1,300 MWe and 1,450 MWe reactor containment
A GPR meeting is planned for late 2012 to look at the issues of
the 1,300 MWe and 1,450 MWe reactor containment, in
particular in the run-up to the third ten-yearly outage
inspections for the 1,300 MWe reactors. The GPR will in
particular examine the double-wall containment, the doublewall
containment internal ventilation system, the containment
penetrations, the containment extensions and the
corresponding bypass risks, as well as the behaviour of the
auxiliary buildings.
Review of safety associated with ten-yearly outages
In 2012, ASN will attentively continue its examination of the
safety reviews of NPPs that are associated with the ten-yearly
outages. ASN considers this step to be crucial in gaining a
precise understanding of the condition of the reactors, but
also for continuously improving the safety of the facilities.
One year after the end of each ten-yearly inspection, ASN will
issue its opinion on the ability of each reactor to continue to
operate and, as necessar y, will specify the technical
requirements needed to manage and monitor this continued
operation. In 2012, ASN will make its position known
following the third ten-yearly inspections of Bugey reactors 2,
4 and 5, Dampierre 1 and Tricastin 2.
Continuing operation beyond 40 years
As EDF has indicated its desire to extend the operating life of its
reactors up to 60 years, ASN will pursue its examination of the
possible conditions for extension of their operation. In 2012,
following a meeting of the GPR concerning the programme of
study and work proposed by EDF with a view to extending
reactor operations, ASN will make its position known. For
ASN, extension of reactor operations beyond forty years can
only be envisaged if it is associated with a proactive and farreaching
programme for improved safety that is in line with the
safety objectives adopted for new reactors and with best
international practice.
Complementary safety assessments following the
Fukushima accident
ASN will issue technical requirements to EDF as a result of its
analysis of the complementary safety assessments. The purpose
of these requirements will be to cover all the technical topics
resulting from the analysis of the Fukushima accident, for
example with regard to the robustness of the facilities to
earthquake and flooding, to loss of electrical sources or heat
sink, severe accident management, consideration of human and
organisational factors and subcontracting.
In addition, the action taken further to the 2011 inspections in
response to this accident will be checked in 2012, either as part
of the normal programme of ASN inspections, or during the
course of specific inspections.
ASN will draw the conclusions of the ongoing European peerreviews,
in which it is a participant and one objective of which
is to compare the requirements stipulated by the safety
regulators or the measures proposed by the foreign licensees.
It will take part in international experience feedback on the
subject, paying particular attention to understanding of the
accident, management of the operations to regain control of the
facility, decommissioning and decontaminating the facility and
making it safe.
ASN will make modifications to its programme to update the
baseline safety requirements applicable to the design of new
nuclear facilities, but also, as part of the periodic safety reviews,
for the facilities currently in operation.
ASN will contribute to the expression of R&D requirements to
be added in the medium term to the applicable baseline safety
requirements for the prevention of this type of accident and to
improvements in the understanding of severe accidents and
post-accident management.
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