ASN Report 2020

enables the oversight of the facilities to be adapted and thus focused on those with the highest risks, in terms of the inspections and the examinations carried out by ASN. For example, the RHF and Cabri research reactors are placed in categories 1 and 2 respectively, while the Ganil particle accelerator is placed in category 3. 2.2  The periodic safety reviews The Environment Code requires that the licensees carry out a periodic safety review of their facilities every ten years. This periodic safety review is designed to assess the status of the facility with respect to the applicable regulations and to update the assessment of the risks or detrimental effects inherent in the facility, notably taking into account the condition of the facility, acquired operating experience, changes in knowledge and the rules applicable to similar facilities. They are thus an opportunity for upgrades or improvements in fields in which the safety requirements have changed, in particular seismic resistance, protection against fire and confinement. To date, all the nuclear research and miscellaneous facilities have undergone a periodic safety review. For facilities which had not yet undergone a first review, the Decree of 2 November 2007 required that the licensees submit their first periodic safety review report no later than November 2017. ASN subsequently implemented an examination method commensurate with the issues in the facilities: some facilities require particular attention due to the risks they present, while for others presenting a lower level of risk, the extent of the inspections and examinations is adapted accordingly. The technical examination of all the periodic safety review reports will take several years, owing to the specific nature of each of the facilities concerned. For example, on 1 November 2017, the CEA transmitted 16 periodic safety review reports to ASN. The CEA then informed ASN that it wished to even out the workload involved in these reviews, in terms of its organisation and its resources, by bringing forward the submission of the periodic safety review reports for certain facilities in the coming decade. ASN is in favour of this approach. In 2020, ASN continued with on-site inspections specifically devoted to the periodic safety review of the facilities. It finds that the CEA has now better assimilated the problems relating to the review, thanks to the implementation on each site of a transverse organisation specifically devoted to this process. 2.3  Lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident In the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, ASN initiated a stress tests approach for the nuclear facilities. The approach consists in assessing the safety margins in the facilities with regard to their ability to withstand a loss of electrical power, or cooling, and extreme natural hazards. In May 2011, ASN required that stress tests be carried out on the BNIs with the highest level of risk in the light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident (batch 1). For the CEA BNIs (Masurca, Osiris and JHR) and the ILL’s RHF, in batch 1, ASN in 2012 ordered the implementation of organisational and material provisions, called the “hardened safety core” in the light of the conclusions of the stress tests. ASN notably observes that the large-scale work on the RHF research reactor was carried out rapidly and satisfactorily, notably with the construction of new and robust emergency management premises, reinforcement of the tightness of the reactor building to extreme flooding and the installation or modification of back-up systems to prevent risks relating to the loss of cooling. The stress tests were continued for a second group (batch 2) of 22 facilities with lesser safety implications. These include the UPRA, CEA research facilities (Atalante, Cabri, LECA and Orphée) and ITER. The emergency management resources in the CEA centres in Cadarache, Marcoule and Saclay were reviewed under the second batch of stress tests. In 2015, ASN ordered the implementation of new emergency management means, more particularly the construction or reinforcement of the “hardened safety core” emergency centres so that they could withstand extreme climatic conditions. It finds that these projects are behind schedule on all the CEA centres, for various reasons, and that the initial deadlines were not met. With regard to the Cadarache centre, ASN agreed to the request for postponement of construction of the emergency centre buildings, given that the main risk considered for the site is associated with the JHR reactor, for which commissioning has been delayed. For the Saclay centre, after formal notice from ASN on 6 September 2019, the CEA transmitted the file justifying the sizing of the future emergency management buildings in December 2019, with commissioning scheduled for the end of 2021. Finally, for the Marcoule centre, ASN is still waiting for additional data regarding the strength of the existing emergency management buildings (confinement, accessibility, operability, habitability, etc.). Finally, of the thirty other Laboratories, Plants, Decommissioning and Waste (LUDD) facilities with the lowest safety implications (batch 3), ASN issued a binding requirement in 2013 on the CEA facilities (Lefca, LECI, Poséidon, Magenta and STAR), the Ganil and the irradiators of the Ionisos and Steris groups, regarding a calendar for submission of the stress tests reports running until 2020. For these facilities, the stress tests will be examined as part of a periodic safety review, as is currently the case for the irradiators of the Ionisos group. 336 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 12 – NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES