ASN Report 2017

398 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 14  - Nuclear research and miscellaneous industrial facilities The inspections carried out in 2017 show that: ཛྷ ཛྷ The CEA analyses of deviations must be more systematic and carried out in greater depth. ཛྷ ཛྷ The long-term protection of buildings against fire requires greater surveillance on all the BNIs. ཛྷ ཛྷ Failures in the reactivity of the alert systems on the Saclay site were observed. ASN will thus be vigilant to the availability, upkeep and upgrading of the specific communication and alert means on the Saclay site facilities. ཛྷ ཛྷ CEA must reinforce the presence of its personnel in the field for the monitoring of outside contractors. Marcoule Centre The Marcoule centre is dedicated to the back-end fuel cycle, radioactive waste in particular. Apart from the defence- related nuclear facilities, it also houses three BNIs operated by CEA: Atalante (see this chapter), Phénix (see chapter 15) and Diadem (see chapter 16) as well as three other BNIs, not operated by CEA: the Gammatec irradiator, Melox (see chapter 13) and Centraco (see chapter 16). In 2017, ASN carried out twelve inspections at the CEA Marcoule centre, three of which were conducted jointly with the Defence Nuclear Safety Authority (ASND). Two inspections in particular, performed jointly with ASND, concerned the transverse organisation set up in the centre concerning the transport of radioactive substances and protection against the fire risk: ཛྷ ཛྷ The inspection on the fire topic aimed to check the working of the centre’s Local Safety Organisation (FLS). It was shown that the coordination between this team and the centre’s individual facilities needed to be improved, notably by defining and regularly carrying out exercises proportionate to the issues involved in each facility, as well as by the systematic transmission of updated facility drawings to the FLS. These drawings are an essential operational decision- making aid for the response teams. ཛྷ ཛྷ The centre’s organisation devoted to the transport of radioactive substances for its part appeared to be satisfactory. It showed that the corrective measures decided on following significant events are implemented rapidly and are effective. However, areas for improvement were identified regarding the analysis of root causes and the preventive means to be implemented. ASN considers that the level of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the Marcoule centre’s BNIs is on the whole satisfactory. Fontenay-aux-Roses Centre The two BNIs in this centre are currently being decommissioned (see chapter 15). Grenoble Centre All the BNIs in this centre are currently being decommissioned (see chapter 15). 1.2.2 Research reactors The purpose of nuclear research reactors is to contribute to scientific and technological research and to improve the operation of the nuclear power plants. Each of them is a specific facility, for which ASN adapts its regulation and oversight to the particular risks and detrimental effects. In recent years, the licensees have developed a more generic approach to the safety case for these facilities, derived from that used for the nuclear power reactors. This approach in particular concerns the safety assessment based on “operating conditions” and the safety classification of the equipment. It led to the identification and implementation of additional provisions which constitute safety improvements. This approach is also used for the periodic safety reviews of the facilities as well as for the design of new reactors. Critical mock-ups Masurca reactor (Cadarache) The very low-power (5 kW) Masurca reactor (BNI 39), whose creation was authorised by a Decree dated 14th December 1966, is intended for neutron studies – chiefly for the cores of fast neutron reactors – and the development of neutron measurement techniques. The reactor has been shut down since 2007. In its current configuration, BNI 39 is characterised by very limited safety implications in terms of management of risks and detrimental effects. Since 2014, there have been no fissile materials in the installation. Following the examination of the periodic safety review report transmitted by CEA in April  2015, in early 2018 ASN considered that CEA could continue to operate this BNI in its current configuration. Moreover, in order to ensure continued operation of this BNI, CEA decided in 2016 on extensive refurbishment, notably with the construction of a New BNI Disposal and Handling Building (N-BSM). CEA thus transmitted the modification authorisation application in 2016. This application and a stress test of the facility in its refurbished configuration are currently being examined. ÉOLE and Minerve reactors (Cadarache) The experimental ÉOLE and Minerve reactors are very low- power (less than 1 kW) critical mock-ups, used for neutron studies, in particular to evaluate the absorption of gamma rays or neutrons by materials. The ÉOLE reactor (BNI 42), the creation of which was authorised by the Decree of 23rd June 1965, is mainly intended for neutron studies of moderated arrays, in particular those of Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWR). The Minerve reactor (BNI 95), whose transfer from the Fontenay-aux-Roses research centre to the Cadarache research centre was authorised by the Decree 77-1072 of 21st September 1977, is situated in the same hall as the ÉOLE reactor. Teaching and research activities took place on these mock- ups until their final shutdown on 31st December 2017. The closure date for submission of the decommissioning file was