ASN Report 2017

350 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 12  - EDF Nuclear Power Plants among contractors. These points were the subject of requests in the follow-up letters to the inspections performed by ASN. The inspections relating to lightning reveal the need on all sites to set up an organisation and reinforced oversight to improve the integration of the regulatory requirements concerning the management of this hazard. The lightning risk assessments can be based on information which does not actually reflect the real situation on the facilities. ASN also observes a significant delay in the performance of the work identified in the technical studies. The deadlines for performance of the periodic checks on the lightning protection systems by the competent inspection organisations are on the whole not adhered to. These points were the subject of requests for corrective action. 2.4.7 Monitoring facilities compliance with the requirements Maintaining the compliance of the facilities with their design, construction and operating requirements is a major issue insofar as this compliance is essential in demonstrating the protection of interests. The processes employed by the licensee, notably during reactor outages, contribute to maintaining the compliance of the facilities with the requirements resulting from this demonstration. Reactor outages Nuclear power reactors need to be periodically shut down in order to renew the fuel, which gradually becomes depleted during the electricity production cycle. One third or one quarter of the fuel is thus renewed at each outage. These outages mean that it is temporarily possible to access parts of the installation that would not normally be accessible during production. They are therefore an opportunity to verify the condition of the equipment by running checks and tests and performing maintenance work, as well as to carry out work on the facility. These refuelling outages can be of several types: ཛྷ ཛྷ Refuelling Outage (ASR) and Partial Inspection (VP) outage: these outages last a few weeks and are devoted to renewing part of the fuel and conducting a programme of verification and maintenance that is more extensive during a Partial Inspection (VP) than during a Refuelling Outage (ASR); ཛྷ ཛྷ Ten-yearly Outage (VD): this outage entails a wide-ranging verification and maintenance programme. This type of outage, which lasts several months and takes place every 10 years, enables the licensee to carry out major operations such as a complete inspection and hydrotesting on the primary system, a containment test or incorporation of design changes as a result of the periodic safety reviews. These outages are scheduled and prepared for by the licensee several months in advance. ASN checks the steps taken by the licensee to ensure the safety of the facility, protection of the environment and radiation protection of the workers during the outage, as well as the safety of the reactor for the next production cycle. The monitoring performed by ASN, in the light of the provisions of its resolution 2014-DC-0444 of 15th July 2014 concerning shutdowns and restarts of pressurised water reactors, primarily concerns: ཛྷ ཛྷ during the outage preparation phase, the content of the outage programme drawn up by the licensee. As necessary, ASN may ask for additions to this programme; ཛྷ ཛྷ during the outage – through regular briefings and inspections – the implementation of the programme and the handling of any unforeseen circumstances; ཛྷ ཛྷ at the end of outage, when the licensee presents its reactor outage report, the condition of the reactor and its readiness for restart. After this inspection, ASN will either approve reactor restart, or not; ཛྷ ཛྷ after the reactor restarts, the results of all tests carried out during the outage and during the restart phase. The identification and handling of deviations The checks initiated by EDF for its operating baseline requirements and the additional verifications requested by ASN on the basis more particularly of operating experience feedback, can lead to the detection of deviations from the defined requirements, which must then be processed. These deviations can have a variety of origins: design problems, construction errors, insufficient management of maintenance work, deterioration through ageing, etc. The measures for detecting and correcting deviations, prescribed by the Order of 7th February 2012, play an essential role in maintaining the level of safety of the facilities. FUNDAMENTALS The defined requirements The Order of 7th February 2012 states that a defined requirement is a “requirement assigned to an Element Important for Protection (EIP), so that, with the expected characteristics, it performs the function stipulated in the safety case mentioned in the second paragraph of Article L. 593-7 of the Environment Code, or to an Activity Important for Protection (AIP) so that it meets is objectives with respect to this safety case” . For the EIP, these requirements can in particular concern: ཛྷ ཛྷ the characteristics of the materials used; ཛྷ ཛྷ the manufacturing, assembly, erection and repair processes; ཛྷ ཛྷ the physical parameters and criteria characteristic of the performance of the EIP. For the AIP, these requirements can in particular concern: ཛྷ ཛྷ the skills needed to perform the activity; ཛྷ ཛྷ any qualifications necessary; ཛྷ ཛྷ checks and hold points; ཛྷ ཛྷ the equipment and hardware needed to enable the activity to be carried out in accordance with the regulatory or even contractual requirements, such as to guarantee compliance with the safety case.

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