ASN Report 2017

24 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 05 Radiological emergency and post-accident situations the notification of significant radiation protection events. In the field of environmental protection, ASN will continue with its regulatory work to implement the provisions of the TECV Act and the transposition to BNIs of the 24th November 2010 Directive on Industrial Emissions, known as the “IED Directive” and the 4th July 2012 Directive concerning major accidents involving hazardous substances, known as the “Seveso 3 Directive”. Despite all the precautions taken, an accident can never be completely ruled out and the necessary provisions for managing a radiological emergency situation must be planned for, regularly tested and revised. These emergency situations are covered by specific material and organisational arrangements, which involve both the licensee and the party responsible for the activity and the public authorities. ASN takes part in management of these situations, for questions concerning the regulation and oversight of nuclear safety and radiation protection. It has the following four roles: ཛྷ ཛྷ ensure and verify the soundness of the steps taken by the licensee; ཛྷ ཛྷ advise the Government and its local representatives; ཛྷ ཛྷ contribute to the circulation of information; ཛྷ ཛྷ act as Competent Authority within the framework of the international conventions. The ASNemergency response organisation set up to deal with a nuclear accident in a BNI more specifically comprises: ཛྷ ཛྷ the participation of ASN staff in the various units of the French Inter- ministerial Crisis Committee; ཛྷ ཛྷ at the national level, an emergency centre in Montrouge, consisting of three Command Posts (PC): a Strategic Command Post consisting of the ASN Commission, a Technical Command Post in constant contact with its technical support organisation, IRSN, and a Communication Command Post. ཛྷ ཛྷ at the local level, ASN representatives visit the département and zone Prefects to help them with their decisions and their communication actions; ASN inspectors may also go to the site affected by the accident. Significant events In 2017, the national emergency centre was activated on 14 occasions, for four real situations and ten national exercises. Of the national exercises, two concerned defence BNIs or sites under the responsibility of the Defence Nuclear Safety Authority (ASND) and two included a malicious initiator. The programme of exercises comprised two atypical exercises: an NRBC exercise (Nuclear, Radiological, Bacteriological or Chemical malicious act) and a training exercise for the départements in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region in the deployment of post-accident measures (restrictions on the consumption and sale of local produce). The real situations in 2017 concerned two Greenpeace intrusions on the Cattenom and Cruas-Meysse NPPs, and two activations of the On-site Emergency Plan (PUI) on the Bugey NPP. The first activation, as a result of a fire on a roof in a controlled area during a worksite, had no environmental consequences, as the fire was rapidly extinguished, and was rated level 0 on the INES scale. The second event concerned the blockage of a valve which led to the shutdown of reactor 2. The licensee implemented its incident management procedures, enabling a controlled state to be restored in a few hours. This event, rated level 1 on the INES scale, had no environmental impact. Following each of these events, ASN carried out inspections and learned the necessary lessons. In 2017, ASN also took part in several international exercises organised by the IAEA, Switzerland and Spain, as well as one tabletop exercise with Germany. Finally, during the national exercise on the Cattenom NPP, ASN tested Significant events and outlook