ASN Report 2017

109 ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2017 Chapter 03  - Regulations to ASN licensing or notification of ASN depending on the general criteria set by these texts, which must be clarified by an ASN resolution. In this respect, the wording of Article 27 of the Decree of 7th November 2007 derived from the Decree of 28th June  2016 states: ཛྷ ཛྷ “Art. 27- Notification of ASN is required for the modifications mentioned in Article L. 593-15 of the Environment Code, which do not significantly call into question the safety analysis report or the installation impact assessment and the list of which is set by decision of this authority, taking account of the following criteria: -- “1° The nature of the facility and the scale of its risks and detrimental effects on the interests mentioned in Article L. 593-1; -- “2° The technical capabilities of the licensee and the internal oversight measures it puts in place to prepare for these modifications.” Furthermore, as at 31st December 2017, these tests put an end to the internal licensing systems which hitherto had been used by certain licensees after approval by ASN and the scope of which had, until 31st December 2017, constituted the list of modifications requiring notification. The resolution provides a regulatory framework for the management of all noteworthy modifications to BNIs, drawing on the provisions of the Order of 7th February 2012, which it clarifies. The resolution stipulates that the management of noteworthy modifications of a BNI is an activity important for protection, that the licensee must define a management method for noteworthy modifications that is proportionate to the implications and that this management method must offer verification guarantees following on from those of the internal licensing system. ASN reserves the right to restrict the scope of noteworthy modifications subject to notification if the licensee’s internal monitoring proves to be insufficient. The resolution sets the general criteria to be met by the noteworthy modifications subject to notification: procedural compatibility criteria, general fundamental doctrine criterion, general criteria which, in similar forms, appear in most internal licensing systems, criteria linked to consideration of the risks or drawbacks the modification is liable to create during the performance phase as well as criteria and provisions specific to certain types of modifications: documentary organisational modifications; incident and accident response strategies; temporary modifications to the technical operating specifications of the general operating rules for NPP reactors; waste zoning modifications; hardware modifications; modifications concerning the preparedness for and management of emergency situations; modifications of NPP reactor fuel and modifications concerning the transport of radioactive substances. These resolutions supplement the legal framework made up of the regulations in force: ཛྷ ཛྷ Resolution 2016-DC-0578 of 6th December 2016 on the prevention of risks resulting from the dispersal of pathogenic micro-organisms (legionella and amoeba) by PWR secondary system cooling installations. The resolution reinforces the prevention of risks resulting from the dispersal of pathogenic micro-organisms. It sets requirements concerning the design, upkeep and monitoring of installations, the maximum legionella concentrations in the facility’s cooling water and downstream, with regard to amoeba, the steps to be taken in the event of a proliferation of microorganisms in the systems or infection identified in the vicinity of the facility, as well as information of the public and the administrations in the event of proliferation of micro-organisms. To the extent possible, the resolution aims to align the requirements applicable to the NPP large cooling towers with those applicable to cooling towers of other industries with respect to legionella. However, owing to the considerable flow rates and volumes of water in the NPP cooling towers, certain requirements applicable to other industries would lead to an excessive environmental impact from biocidal treatments. Certain provisions were therefore adapted. Furthermore, the resolution also regulates the prevention of amoeba risks, already specified in the individual regulations of the NPPs. ཛྷ ཛྷ Resolution 2016-DC-0571 of 11th October 2016 containing various provisions regarding nuclear pressure equipment conformity. This was issued following changes to the Environment Code (Decree 2015-799 of 1st July 2015 concerning products and equipment entailing a risk) and the publication of the 30th December 2015 Order on nuclear pressure equipment. This resolution contains the provisions concerning the changes needed for application of the modules for assessment of conformity, the compliance notification model and the state of the art for the design and manufacture of category 0 nuclear pressure equipment. ཛྷ ཛྷ Resolution 2016-DC-0569 of 29th September 2016 modifying resolution 2013-DC-0360 of 16th July 2013 relative to control of detrimental effects and the impact of basic nuclear installations on health and the environment. It requests the implementation of an approach proportionate to the implications and takes account of recent changes to the regulations, in particular the entry into force on 1st June 2015 of Directive 2012/18/EU from the European Parliament and Council of 4th July 2012 concerning management of the hazards linked to major accidents involving hazardous substances, known as the “Seveso 3 Directive”, as well as changes to the Environment Code resulting from the Ordinance of 10th February 2016 containing various nuclear provisions. ཛྷ ཛྷ Resolution 2015-DC-0532 of 17th November 2015 concerning the BNI safety analysis report. It specifies the contents of the safety analysis report the licensee is required to transmit to ASN in its BNI creation, commissioning or decommissioning authorisation application file. The main provisions of this resolution concern the objectives of the safety analysis report, the principles underpinning the drafting and updating of the safety analysis report, compliance with the legislative and regulatory requirements, the description of the BNI and provisions intended for management of the risks it presents, the nuclear safety case (management of the risks presented by the facility), the on-site emergency plan design study, particular operations such as BNI construction, management of radioactive sources and on-site transport operations, plus requirements specific to certain BNIs, more particularly BNIs for example comprising one or more nuclear reactors.